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1 Introduction
I argue that the framework proposed in Reinhart&Reuland(93) is successfully able to
account for Condition B effects which so far had needed a reconstructional analysis. I
discuss cases where the ‘Minimize Restrictor’ condition proposed in Chomsky(92) rules
out valid co-indexings. Based on this and some other facts, I propose that the ‘Minimize
Restrictor’ condition is only needed to derive Condition C effects.
2 Background Assumptions
In this paper, I utilize the framework proposed by Reinhart&Reuland (1993). This frame-
work consists of the following principles/conditions:
(1) [Condition A] A reflexive-marked syntactic predicate is reflexive.
(2) [Condition B] A reflexive semantic predicate is reflexive-marked.
(3) [Chain Condition] A maximal A-chain ( ) has exactly one link: ,
which is both +R and marked for structural case and exactly one -marked
link.
A predicate is reflexive-marked if at least one of its arguments is an anaphor. The conditions
A and B of Reinhart&Reuland (1993) reproduce most of the effects of the conditions A
and B of GB theory. From this point onwards, I shall refer to conditions A and B of
Reinhart&Reuland (1993) as conditions A and B and to conditions A and B of GB
theory as A and B .
(4) a. * John likes himself .
b. * Ed likes him .
In (4a), Condition A forces John to be coreferent with the anaphor himself since the
presence of an anaphor as an argument of likemakes like reflexive. If John and the anaphor
are not coindexed, we have a non reflexive reflexive marked predicate which is ruled out
by Condition A . Similarly in (4b), Condition B forces Ed to be disjoint with him. If
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Ed and him were coindexed, like which is not reflexive-marked would become a reflexive
predicate - this would be ruled out by Condition B .
The Chain Condition is however quite different from Condition C of the standard
binding theory (Chomsky (1981, 1986a)). So while a sentence like (5) would be ruled out
by Condition C , it would not be ruled out by the Chain condition.
(5) * She thought that Ed liked Janet .
This is not a gap in the framework proposed by Reinhart&Reuland (1993). They consider
binding theory to consist only of Conditions A and B, and to govern only bound variable
anaphora - Condition C is argued in Reinhart (1983a) and Grodzinsky&Reinhart (1993) to
belong to a separate inferential module.
3 Reconstructional Phenomena
Reinhart&Reuland(93) note that adopting a theory of logophoric anaphora eliminates the
need for reconstruction mechanisms in the case of Condition A. (give page no.)
Consider the examples in (6a) and (6b). In both of these the embedded subject Bill can
be coindexed with the moved anaphor. Assuming the minimalist assumptions that binding
theory conditions apply at LF and also assuming that c-command is one of the relevant
conditions, this fact provides evidence that the moved wh-phrase can be construed lower,
as the object of the embedded clause at LF. at some
(6) a. John wondered [which picture of himself ] [Bill saw t ]
b. [Which picture of himself ] does John think Bill likes t ?
It should be noted that the reconstruction in (6a) and (6b) is optional. The anaphor can be
bound by either the matrix or the lower binder reflecting under minimalist assumptions, the
LF position of the anaphor.
Reinhart & Reuland account for the above data by a very different theoretical device.
Note that the definitions of Conditions A and B involve the word predicate. A
predicate is formed only when there is an external argument. This captures the intuition
seen in several versions of binding theory that there is something special about the Subject.
This was reflected in the use of notions such as Accesible Subject. In NPs like ‘which
picture of himself’, picture does not form a predicate since it does not have an external
argument. As a result neither Condition A nor Condition B apply to the anaphor
in question - as a result it can act like a logophor and refer freely subject to pragmatic
constraints. So in both (6a) and (6b) , the anaphor can refer to either the matrix or the
embedded subject.
Reinhart&Reuland (1993) also note, however, that this does not entail that the problem
of reconstruction is eliminated altogether. So far, reconstruction may still be needed for
cases of Condition B and C.
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In the following sections, I show that we need not appeal to reconstruction to obtain
Condition B effects within Reinhart&Reuland (1993). I also show that obligatory recon-
struction of the kind enforced by the principle of ‘Minimize Restrictor’ rules out certain
legal coindexings.
3.1 Condition B and reconstruction
Based on the examples in (6a) and (6b), Chomsky (1993) claims that we need a conception
of binding theory which distinguishes condition A, which does not force reconstruction,
from conditions B and C, which do.
(7) John wondered [which picture of Tom ] [he liked t ]
(8) John wondered [which picture of him ] [Bill took t ]
(9) John wondered [what attitude about him ] [Bill had t ]
While in (6a) and (6b), the reconstruction was optional (7), (8) and (9) are all cases of
obligatory reconstruction. If like in the case of (6a) or (6b) the reconstruction was optional
we would expect that in (7), Tom and he can be coreferent. Similarly for (8) and (9).
As discussed earlier, in the framework of Reinhart & Reuland (1993) Condition C is not
part of the binding theory which only consists of Conditions A, B and the Chain Condition.
(7) involves Condition C, hence since I am using the framework of Reinhart & Reuland
(1993) I will put it aside for now.
My analysis of (8) and (9) starts with the observation that they are both cases of NPs
that involve an idiomatic reading - they have also been analyzed as having a PRO subject.
Note the contrast in (10a) and (10b).
(10) a. John saw [a picture of him ].
b. * John took [a picture of him ].
(11) * John had [an attitude about him ].
Chomsky (1986b) argued that (10b) (or 11) had a structure that contained a PROelement
controlled by the matrix subject as shown in (12).
(12) * John took [PRO picture of him ].
Thus the standard Condition B rule out the following sentence.
The PRO analysis has the problem that while the PRO is needed for the ‘take a picture’
cases, it’s presence in ‘see a picture’ produces illicit readings. The problem is that if the
PRO in ‘a picture of...’ is obligatory (10a) should be ungrammatical while if it is optional
(10b) should be grammatical. The insight beingmissed is that the presence of PRO/external
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argument of the NP is conditioned by the predicate. This insight is captured by Williams
(1985, 1987) implicit arguments analysis.
FurtherWilliams (1982, 1985, 1987) has argued that such a PRO analysis is not feasible
- these apparent control effects surface even where a PRO is not possible. Instead he
proposes that the N-agent role which is not syntactically realized, is satisfied in the lexicon
and can get a referential value either by control or from the context. Cf. (10b) and (11)
Chomsky (1993) does not use the PRO solution and instead argues that the idiomatic
reading is available only when ‘take...picture’ forms a unit at LF. This can be seen in the
(minimalist) LFs for (8) and (9) given in (13a) and (13b) respectively:
(13) a. John wondered [which x][Bill took [x picture of him ]](LF for (8))
b. John wondered [what x][Bill had [x attitude about him ]](LF for (9))
The notion of ‘unit at LF’ refers to string contiguity at LF. Chomsky(92) rules out LFs like
(14a) by having a principle called ‘Minimize Restrictor’ - minimize the restrictor wherever
you can - This principle forces reconstruction in all Condition B and C environments.
(14) a. # John wondered [which picture of him x][Bill took [x ]]
b. John wondered [which x][Bill took [x picture of him]]
(14a) is ruled out because of the existence of the convergent (14b) where the restrictor has
been minimized.
Both (8) and (9) can be handled within Reinhart&Reuland(93) - these are both examples
where the lexical semantics of the verb causes theN-agent roles of the noun to be instantiated
as identical to the agent of the verb. Now Condition B is enough to rule out any
coindexing between ‘Bill’ and ‘him’ since this would cause the semantic predicate ‘picture’
to be reflexive even though it is not reflexive-marked.
Requiring ‘Minimize Restrictor’ to apply in all Condition B environments seems to be
too strong as it rules out several cases of legal coindexation. Consider (15).
(15) Mary wondered [which picture of him ] [Bill submitted t for the fashion show].
If the restrictor needed to be minimized in all cases, (15) would be out since it would
have the LF in (16):
(16) Mary wondered [which x] [Bill submitted [x picture of him] for the fashion show].
(16) violates the standard binding condition B and hence (15) should be ungrammatical.
A PRO analysis would get us (15) but would have problems as discussed earlier with
sentences like (17).
(17) * Mary wondered [which picture of him ] Bill took t for the fashion show.
If the picture NP had a PRO (15) could have the following legal LF:
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(18) Mary wondered [which x] [Bill submitted [x PRO picture of him ] for the fashion
show].
However this would lead us to expect the grammaticality of the ungrammatical (17) since
it would have an LF very similar to (18). This problem arises, as discussed before, because
the relationship between take and the picture-NP is not taken into consideration.
Reinhart & Reuland (1993) are able to account for this reading. take instantiates the
implicit argument of the picture-NP as its agent and thus causes the formation of a non-
reflexive marked reflexive predicate and hence a Condition B violation. The lexical
semantics of submit are different and coindexing the pronoun in the picture-NP with the
agent of submit does not lead to a Condition B violation.
3.2 Reconstruction for Interpretation
In the previous section, we have seen that we do not need a special operation of reconstruc-
tion to deriveConditionB binding effects. Further in the case of ConditionB, reconstruction
is obligatory only in idiomatic environments such as ‘take a picture’. Reconstruction for
reasons of interpretation is however not ruled out. Cf.(19)
(19) Who wanted John to destroy how many pictures that he had painted?
Heycock (1993)(following Kroch (1989)) claims that (19) has two readings: a nonref-
erential reading(LF in (20a) and a referential, non D-linked reading(LF in (20b)).
(20) a. [Howmany x][who y] y wanted John to destroy [x pictures that he had painted]
b. [How many pictures that he had painted x][who y] y wanted John to destroy
[x]
With minimization of restrictor, (20b) would not be a legal LF. However, the reading
in (20b) does seem to be available. If following the argumentation in Kroch (1989) we
assume that the LF in (20b) is the correct representation for the referential, non D-linked
reading then Minimize Restrictor would rule out such representations a-priori. This does
not seem desirable.
3.3 Problems with anaphors
In Chomsky (1993), ConditionA environments such as (21a) do not obligatorily reconstruct
because the anaphor can cliticize to the matrix verb yielding the (non reconstructing) LF in
(21b):
(21) a. John wondered [which picture of himself] [Bill likes t ]
b. John self-wondered [which picture of t x] [Bill likes x]
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Minimizing the restrictor will lead to deletion of t , breaking the chain (self, t ) and
leaving the reflexive element without a -role at LF. A reconstructing derivation also
exists(22), in which the anaphor cliticizes onto ‘likes’.
(22) John wondered [which x][Bill self-likes [x pictures of t ]].
The crucial thing is that LF-cliticization of the anaphor is deemed sufficient to block
Minimize Restrictor - It is ranked below other principles. If there are two convergent
derivations from the same numeration only one of which minimizes restrictor, then the
one with the minimized restrictor blocks the other. However if the derivation crashes as a
result of minimizing restrictor, then it is legal not to minimize restrictor. There are some
conceptual problems with this approach. Consider the (illegal) reconstructing derivation in
which self cliticizes to wonder and we also minimize restrictor:
(23) John self-wondered [which x] [Bill likes x picture of self]
Note that since in the minimalist program, we have a copy theory of movement, the lower
copy is left intact - the upper copy which had had movement of self out of it is deleted since
we are minimizing restrictor. While it is clear that (23) is an illegitimate derivation, it is not
clear whether this derivation is bad because it converges as semi-gibberish at LF(no -role
for self) or because it crashes. In order to allow the non-reconstructing derivation to get
through we have to stipulate that it crashes. That this is so is non-obvious.
Further consider (24) where the same ambiguity obtains:
(24) [Which picture of himself ] does John think [ Bill likes t ]
Minimizing restrictorwith self cliticized to the embedded predicate like gives us the reading
where the anaphor is coindexedwithin the embedded clause. ApplyingLF-cliticization from
the landing site leads to a lowering movement: such movements result in an ungoverned
trace and there is considerable evidence that suggests that such movements should not
be permitted at all. On the other hand applying LF-cliticization from the position of the
intermediate trace creates an illicit LF. Further it is not clear if intermediate traces exist at
LF. Considering the close similarity between (24) (21a), we expect an analysis given for
(21a) to carry over to (24). The LF-cliticization analysis does not do well on this account.
Reinhart &Reuland (1993) are able to explain this straightforwardly and also capture the
similarity between (21a) and (24). In both (21a) and (24), the anaphor is in a picture-NP
where predicate formation does not take place. As a result, it can act as a logophor and
refer freely constrained only by discourse.
4 So where do we need ‘Minimize Restrictor’?
‘Minimize Restrictor’ is still needed to derive Condition C effects as in (25a) and (25b).
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(25) a. John wondered [which picture of Tom ] [he liked t ]
b. * Who wanted him to destroy how many pictures that John had painted?
5 Conclusions
We see that ‘Minimize Restrictor’ is not needed to derive Condition A and B effects.
Adopting Reinhart & Reuland (1993)’s framework allows us to account for these cases
without having special rules of reconstruction like ‘Minimize Restrictor’. Further it is not
just redundant but also problematic since it rules out certain LFs which are independently
motivated. Its basic purpose is to drive LF-lowering of R-expressions to feed Condition C
violations.(see Heycock (1993)) The existence of a principle such as ‘Minimize Restrictor’
is puzzling since some kind of ‘least effort’ principle would work in the opposite direction
and would argue for maximization of restrictor since it is easily demonstratable that pruning
the search space at the source makes for a more efficient search strategy.
The fact that Conditions A and B pattern together in not needing ‘Minimize Restrictor’
versus Condition C which does and the fact that Conditions A and B are in a sense local
while condition C is non-local. suggests that treating the binding theory as only consisting
of Conditions A and B is on the right track. Then if ‘Minimize Restrictor’ was part of the
grammar, it would be part of the same inferential module to which Condition C belongs.
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